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We show that in business groups with efficient internal capital markets, resources may be chan- 
nelled to either more- or less-profitable units. Depending on the amount of internal resources, 
a group may exit a market in response to increased competition, or channel funds to the sub- 
sidiary operating in that market. This has important implications for the strategic impact of 
group membership. Affiliation to a monopolistic subsidiary can make a cash-rich (poor) firm 
more (less) vulnerable to entry deterrence. Also, resource flexibility within a group makes sub- 
sidiaries' reaction functions flatter, thus discouraging rivals' strategic commitments when entry 
is accommodated. 
1. Introduction 
* Business groups are a widespread organizational form in many countries. Groups often 
adopt a pyramidal structure, whereby individual subsidiaries are separate legal entities with limited 
liability and autonomous access to external capital markets. This marks a clear difference between 
business groups and multidivisional organizations.1 Yet there is substantial evidence that groups 
establish internal capital markets just like multidivisional firms do.2 While many empirical studies 
of internal capital markets have looked at business groups, theoretical models have instead focused 
on multidivisional firms. This article is one of the first attempts to model the allocation of internal 
resources among group members. 
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1 According to Claessens, Djankov, and Klapper (2000), the fraction of listed firms affiliated with business groups 
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Studies of internal capital markets within groups are also more reliable, to the extent that data on assets and investments 
are better defined at the firm level than at the division level. 
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The idea that business groups behave somehow differently in product markets is by no means 
new. In particular, competition authorities around the world since the Standard Oil case have taken 
seriously the idea that firms' access to a group's deep pockets may be a source of market power.3 
However, the exact mechanism through which the ability to shift resources across group members 
affects their competitive behavior has not yet been clarified. For instance, while some empirical 
studies suggest that groups do better than stand-alone firms in deterring entry (Lawrence, 1991), 
formal reasoning indicates that resource flexibility may well prevent a group from committing to 
provide a member firm with deep pockets (Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002). We study how internal 
resources are reallocated in response to changes in a group's actual or prospective markets, and 
how this in turn affects its members' competitive behavior. We thus provide a formal analysis of 
multimarket spillovers generated by internal capital market phenomena. 
We study a business group operating in a monopoly and a duopoly market through two sub- 
sidiaries exerting unobservable R&D efforts. Group members, like stand-alone firms, raise funds 
on the external capital market to complement internal resources. However, while a stand-alone 
firm draws on its own internal funds, a subsidiary's internal resources are pooled with the group's 
resources and then reallocated. Hence, subsidiaries' wealth is endogenously determined by the 
allocation decisions of the group's headquarters. This is crucial in our model, in that the amount 
of internal resources determines the agency problem vis-a-vis outside investors, and thus the in- 
centives of subsidiary managers to exert R&D efforts. Through this channel, the internal resource 
allocation affects a subsidiary's product market strategy. Obviously, the headquarters would al- 
locate resources strategically if its decisions were observable by product market competitors. 
Although our model rules out this possibility, assuming that the allocation is not observable, the 
resource flexibility of business groups still has important strategic effects. 
The central result of the article is that in value-maximizing business groups, resources may 
be channelled to either more- or less-profitable subsidiaries. In other words, both winner picking 
and cross-subsidization may occur. In particular, a group may react to increased competition in 
a market either by exiting so as to focus on less-competitive industries, or by channelling funds 
to the subsidiary operating in that market, depending on the resources it can draw on. In fact, 
unless total resources are scarce, additional internal assets are relatively more valuable for units 
facing a tougher competitive environment, as the latter suffer more-serious agency problems vis- 
a-vis external investors when seeking funds. This result contrasts with previous theoretical work 
arguing that winner picking always takes place in efficient internal capital markets (e.g., Stein, 
1997), and is consistent with extensive evidence of cross-subsidization (see, for instance, Shin 
and Stulz (1998) and Ferris, Kim, and Kitsabunnarat (2003)). 
The article then shows that resource flexibility in business groups has both strategic benefits 
and costs. First, group membership does not necessarily turn a firm into a better entrant in an 
oligopoly market. In fact, while the prospect of subsidization makes a cash-poor firm less sensitive 
to financial constraints and thus to entry deterrence, a cash-rich firm's commitment to its home 
market is dramatically undermined by the possibility that its resources are diverted to more- 
profitable affiliates; this may encourage rivals to adopt predatory practices. However, if the group 
decides to enter (stay) in the duopoly market, cross-subsidization is always optimal. Hence, group 
affiliation is a credible commitment to adopt a tougher R&D strategy in a duopoly market. This 
is in line with empirical findings that, upon entry in a market, group-affiliated firms compete 
more aggressively than stand-alone entities (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1995). A second implication 
of cross-subsidization is that a subsidiary's strategic response to its rivals' actions is partially 
counteracted by a resource reallocation response, so that group members have flatter reaction 
functions than do stand-alone firms. Therefore, group membership is a good defensive strategy 
when entry is accommodated and rivals may adopt aggressive precommitments.4 
3 This concern has been recently expressed by the European Commission in support of its controversial decision 
to forbid the GE-Honeywell merger (Case no. COMP/M.2220, pp. 83-84, July 2001). 
4 However, group affiliation also discourages procollusive commitments that rivals may want to make when 
competition is in strategic complements. When this is the case, stand-alone entry is an optimal strategic choice. 
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This work promotes the understanding of business groups, which so far have mostly been 
the object of empirical investigation (see Khanna (2000) for a survey), but also contributes to 
several other strands of literature. It is obviously related to the theoretical literature on internal 
capital markets (e.g., Stein, 1997; Fluck and Lynch, 1999); it contributes to the literature on 
corporate finance and product markets, dating back to Telser's (1966) study of deep pockets and 
financial entry deterrence, exploring for the first time the interaction between internal capital 
markets and product market competition. The close relation to the literatures on conglomerate 
power and multimarket spillovers (in particular Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985)) is 
also discussed at length below. 
The plan of this article is as follows. In Section 2 we set out the basic model with no strategic 
interaction, characterize the optimal resource allocation, and explain why both cross-subsidization 
and winner picking may occur within groups. Section 3 extends the analysis to the case where a 
group subsidiary competes in a duopoly market. In Section 4 we draw the strategic implications 
of the previous analysis; we then discuss the relation to various strands of literature. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Resource allocation within a business group 
* The basic model. We study a business group composed of two subsidiaries running 
independent projects. There are four agents in the model: subsidiary managers, corporate 
headquarters (HQ), outside investors, and stand-alone firms. Each subsidiary needs to invest 
an amount I in order to start or continue a project. The headquarters has control over corporate 
resources A: it allocates A1 and A2 to subsidiaries 1 and 2, provided A1 + A2 = A. We assume 
A < 21: internal funds are not sufficient to start both projects. After a subsidiary manager is 
assigned Ai < I by headquarters, she seeks additional funds I - Ai from outside investors. 
Investors are completely passive in the model (they just need to break even in order to finance a 
project) and behave competitively in the market for funds. Finally, stand-alone firms are identical 
to business subsidiaries, except that they have control over their own assets. 
Projects. Each project is subject to moral hazard. After her project is financed, manager i chooses 
a level of effort ei C [0, 1]. A simple interpretation is that ei is R&D effort exerted to develop 
a new technology.5 Neither headquarters nor external investors can observe (verify) the level of 
effort exerted. If the manager chooses a level of effort ei, subsidiary i gains a return ri with 
probability ei; with probability 1 - ei, the project fails, and the return is zero. 7ri thus represents 
the productivity of effort for firm i. 
Preferences. All agents are risk neutral. Effort ei imposes a private cost (fi/2)e2 on manager i. We 
assume fA > 7ri, to ensure that the first-best level of effort eFB < 1. We also make the following 
assumption, to ensure that managers face a nontrivial fundraising problem (see Lemma 1 later). 
Assumption 1. 
2 2 
</ < 4 - 2fi' 
Neither subsidiary managers nor the headquarters enjoy private benefits from running 
(controlling) extra projects. The headquarters' resource allocation maximizes the group's value. 
Note that in our model units could simply commit ex ante to an optimal resource allocation policy. 
By having headquarters decide, we are implicitly assuming that affiliated firms relinquish control 
over assets to this third party and design its incentives so as to implement the optimal allocation 
rule.6 
5 The R&D interpretation is particularly appropriate, as ei is taken to be the strategic variable of a product market 
game in Sections 3 and 4. As we will see, other dimensions of managerial effort (e.g., advertising effort) are consistent 
with our model, as long as increased effort in one firm reduces its rival's expected profits. 
6 The need to delegate control to headquarters could be endogenized by introducing in the model ex ante uncertainty 
on the subsidiaries' productivity or the degree of competition in each market. As the optimal resource reallocation is 
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FIGURE 1 
TIME LINE 
0 1 2 3 
HQ allocates Subsidiaries Subsidiary Returns 
internal raise I-Ai on managers accrue 
resources external capital choose 
market effort ei 
Timing. The timing of events is as follows (see also Figure 1). 
t = 0 (internal capital market allocation). Headquarters allocates total resources A, assigning A1 
and A2 to subsidiaries 1 and 2. 
t = 1 (financial contracting). Provided it is profitable to start a project, each subsidiary manager 
seeks I - Ai (i = 1, 2) on the external capital market. She makes a contract offer to outside 
investors, who can accept or reject the offer. 
t = 2 (moral hazard). Each subsidiary manager chooses a level of effort. 
t = 3. Returns are realized and outside investors are paid according to financial contracts. 
Financial contracts. When manager i raises funds I - Ai on the external capital market, she 
contracts on the outside investor's share of returns (ai). As the investor can expect to be paid ai 7ri 
in case of success and zero in case of failure, his claim can equivalently be interpreted as debt 
with face value ai7ri or as an equity stake ai. We assume that the rest of the business group is not 
liable for a subsidiary's financial obligations to its financiers.7 
] Financial structure and governance in a business group. Business groups have been 
defined as collections of legally distinct firms that are partly or wholly owned by a single 
individual or family (here the "headquarters") that controls the member firms' assets. Many 
groups have a pyramidal ownership structure whereby the ultimate owner controls several firms 
holding a relatively small fraction of their equity; there is ample evidence that pyramidal groups 
are widespread in Asian, Latin American, and European economies.8 
Our model incorporates two features of corporate groups that make them different from 
multidivisional firms. First, subsidiaries routinely raise funds from and issue claims to external 
financiers; for instance, each company in a group can ask for a bank loan or issue its own 
shares. In contrast, conglomerate divisions do not have autonomous access to financial markets. 
Second, when group subsidiaries are partially owned, the ultimate owner is not responsible for 
the subsidiaries' obligations to outside financiers.9 
contingent on these variables, which may not be verifiable expost, it may be necessary to delegate the resource reallocation 
decision to a third party with the right incentives to maximize group value. However, modelling this stage lies beyond the 
scope of the article. 
7 The limited liability assumption rules out any benefit of conglomeration a la Diamond (1984), where the financial 
advantage of internal capital markets rests upon centralized borrowing by conglomerate headquarters (see also Li and 
Li, 1996). Our article indeed shows that resource flexibility within business groups may bring benefits even when most 
of the funds are collected individually by affiliated firms and the latter have no joint liability. Hence our limited liability 
assumption goes hand in hand with our focus on individual subsidiaries' external finance, rather than on centralized fund 
raising. 
8 In their sample of the 20 largest firms in 27 wealthy economies, La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) 
find that 26% of the firms that have ultimate owners (31% in countries with poor shareholder protection) are controlled 
through pyramidal structures. Bianchi, Bianco, and Enriques (1997) find that 56% of Italian firms belong to a pyramidal 
group. Of these, 37% are holding companies at the top of the pyramid, 31% are wholly owned subsidiaries, and 32% are 
subsidiaries controlled by the ultimate owner with a less than 100% stake. Pyramids are also common in other European 
countries, according to the European Corporate Governance Network (1997). 
9 This rule is common to most legal systems, as argued by legal scholars (see Blumberg, 1989; Hadden, 1983; 
Antunes, 1994). Conversely, and with the notable exception of Bianco and Nicodano (2002) and Nicodano (2003), the 
corporate finance literature has failed so far to recognize limited liability as a salient feature of business groups as opposed 
to multidivisional firms. 
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There is substantial empirical evidence that groups establish internal capital markets.10 Even 
when subsidiaries are only partially owned, the headquarters often enjoys effective control rights 
and can thus redistribute the group's assets, to the extent that the voting rights of noncontrolling 
shareholders are dispersed. One may argue that the legal protection of minority shareholders limits 
the scope for resource reallocation among partially-owned subsidiaries. In practice, however, the 
safeguard provided to minority shareholders is particularly weak in those countries where business 
groups are a main corporate form (see La Porta, L6pez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999).1 In fact, 
the limited authority of minority shareholders in corporate groups has spurred a considerable 
amount of research concerning the conflict of interest between parent company and subsidiaries 
(see, e.g., Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis, 2000; Wolfenzon, 1999). As this conflict is not the 
focus of the present article, we will assume here partially-owned subsidiaries with completely 
passive minority shareholders.12 
In our model -as in previous theoretical work on internal capital markets (Gertner, Scharf- 
stein, and Stein, 1994; Stein, 1997; Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002)-business subsidiaries and 
stand-alone firms differ only in the way control over assets is allocated, whereas the nature of 
the agency problem vis-a-vis external investors is identical. In a business group, headquarters can 
transfer internal resources from one unit to another; once internal resources are allocated, business 
units seek funds on the external market in order to complement their own internal assets. This 
has the following consequence: as the amount of internal assets determines the financial contract 
with outside investors and thus managerial incentives, a subsidiary's managerial incentives and 
hence its value are endogenously determined by the headquarters' allocation decision. Conversely, 
the value of a stand-alone firm depends solely on thatfirm's resources, which are exogenous in 
the model. To derive the optimal resource allocation, we characterize the subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibrium of the game proceeding by backward induction. We first study the financial contracting 
problem of a business unit endowed with resources Ai (i.e., outside financial needs I - Ai). We 
then analyze how at t = 0 a group headquarters assigns resources Ai to affiliated business units, 
anticipating that this will affect contracts with outside investors. 
C Outside finance, internal resources, and business units' agency problems. The financial 
contracting subgame starting at t = 1 can itself be solved by backward induction. The manager's 
effort choice at t = 2 solves 
max ei(l - ai)7ti - e Ai , (ICi) 
eiE[0,1] 2 
which implies ei = (1 - ai)ri/f, if an interior solution is assumed. At date 1, provided it is 
profitable to start a project, manager i makes a take-it-or-leave-it contract offer ai to outside 
10 Houston, James, and Marcus (1997) and Houston and James (1998) find that in bank holding companies, 
subsidiaries' lending activity is more closely tied to the cash flows and capital position of the holding company than it is to 
the bank's own cash flow and capital position, suggesting that bank holding companies establish internal capital markets. 
Perotti and Gelfer (2001) provide evidence of financial reallocation in Russian groups, while Samphantharak (2003) finds 
that internal assets are extensively reallocated within Thai business groups. See also Claessens, Djankov, and Klapper 
(2000) for related evidence on East Asia and Chile. 
Interestingly, in many countries the burden of proof for damages incurred by a subsidiary as a consequence 
of its parent's decisions rests on the claimant, and poor information-disclosure requirements make it almost impossible 
for the latter to offer conclusive evidence (see Rossi, 1996). Even in legal systems with strong minority protection laws, 
free-rider problems may actually hamper shareholder activism: absent a coordination mechanism, dispersed shareholders 
may never actually start a lawsuit for misappropriation against the parent company. 
12 Allowing for minority shareholders' activism in the model would limit the extent of resource reallocation without 
changing the nature of our results. For instance, A might be reinterpreted as the amount of resources that the headquarters 
may safely reshuffle without triggering the expropriated shareholders' reaction. See Samphantharak (2003) for evidence 
that (i) internal capital markets are not perfect when group affiliates are listed companies, owing to stock exchange 
regulations restricting intragroup transfers; and (ii) resource reallocation among nonlisted subsidiaries is not prevented 
by corporate laws and regulations. 
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investors to raise funds I - Ai. The contract must satisfy the investors' participation constraint:13 
eiairi - (I - Ai) > . (IR) 
Investors in fact anticipate that ei = (1 - ai)7ri/p. This can be substituted into the manager's 
objective function and into (IR) to obtain the manager's financial contracting problem at t = 1: 
a (1 ti) 2 Ai 
max r - , 
a,E[0,] 2f8 
subject to 
ai( (1- ai)lr2 > I-Ai. (IRa) 
Clearly, the manager only seeks funds at t = 1 if the value of this program is positive. The 
equilibrium outcome of the financial contracting subgame is characterized in the following lemma. 
Lemma 1. There exists a threshold level of internal resources Ai C [I - (7r2/4p), 1] such that 
(i) If Ai > Ai, the business unit obtains outside finance and starts the project; ea E [0, 1/2] 
and is decreasing in Ai; e* E [ri/2p, 7ri/i] and is increasing in Ai. 
(ii) If A, < Ai, the business unit is either unprofitable or cannot obtain outside funds, hence 
it is shut down. 
Proof. Note first that the manager optimally sets ai so as to make (IR) bind: the investors' 
pledgeable income [ai(1 - ai)/i]Tr2 must be equal to the funds provided, I - Ai. Notice that 
[ai(l - ai)/f3]72 is a concave function of ai and achieves its maximum in ai = 1/2. Hence, if 
maxa, [ai(l - ai)/]fi7r2 = 7r/4p < I - Ai, there is no level of ai that can satisfy the investors' 
(IR) constraint, and the unit cannot be funded. This defines the threshold level of assets Af 
= I - (7r2/4,) below which the unit is financially constrained. By Assumption 1, Af > O. 
If Ai > Af, the unit can raise funds. Suppose it does so: as the manager's utility is decreasing 
in ai, the optimal investors' stake ac* is the smallest solution to [ai(l - ai)/fi]ri2 = I - Ai. 
Hence, c* = (1/2) - (1/4) - [fI(I - A)/rr?], which decreases monotonically from 1/2 to 0 
as Ai increases from Af to I, while e* = [(1 - a*)7ri/p] increases monotonically from 7ri/28 to 
n7i/p. The unit's payoff, ui(Ai) = e*(Ai)ri - (f/2)(e*(Ai))2 - I, can be written as 
u11 Ii J(I - Ai) 3 1 I1 P(I - Ai) 
ui(Al)- = - - _ 
.)1 2 42 2 4 r2 i-4 I. 
Note that ui(Ai) increases monotonically from (37ri2/8I) - I to (T2/2p) - I as Ai increases from 
Af to I. Two cases may then arise. 
Case 1. (3J2/8,) - I > 0. Hence, ui(Af) > O, implying that whenever a business unit can raise 
funds it is optimal to do so: Ai = Af. 
Case 2. (37r2/8F,) - I < 0. In this case, though a manager with Af might raise funds, her utility 
(net of effort costs) would be negative: ui(Af) < 0. Notice also that ui(I) = (7r/2,) - I > 0 by 
13 In our fixed-investment model, where profitability does not vary with project size, the value of investors' claims 
(eia i Ti) does not depend on whether the funds lent are then used within the subsidiary or partly redirected to a different 
unit at date 1. Thus, once internal funds are optimally allocated at t = 0, the headquarters has no incentive to reshuffle 
external funds at t = 1, and investors do not fear any expropriation from the potential tunneling of the funds lent. Our 
model therefore allows us to abstract from the agency costs of tunneling (on this, see Section 5). 
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Assumption 1. Therefore, as ui(Ai) is continuous and strictly increasing in Ai over (Af, I], there 
exists one Af C (Af, I] such that ui(Ai) > 0 VAi > AP. Hence, Ai = AP > Af. By solving 
ui(Ai) = 0, one finds that 
7r/2 - I - 'i r2 - 2 1 ?-fiI-JrV?-2fI 
Ai 
Putting cases 1 and 2 together, the threshold level of assets above which the project is started 
is Ai - max{Af, AP}. Q.E.D. 
The value of each business unit as a function of internal resources Ai can be written as 
0 if Ai < Ai 
Vi(Ai) = 
e*(Aii - (eAi))2 if Ai > Ai. 
A business unit's value is weakly increasing in the amount of its internal resources (see also 
Figure 2). If the unit is financially constrained or simply unprofitable (Ai < Ai), the project is 
not started and hence its value is zero. At Ai = Ai a discontinuity may exist, as additional assets 
allow the unit to raise funds and start a profitable project.14 When Ai > Ai, the unit's value is still 
increasing in Ai: additional internal resources, implying smaller external financial needs, allow 
a reduction in the share of profits ai to be left to outside investors and, thus, an improvement in 
managerial incentives. Notice, however, that the marginal value of internal resources is decreasing: 
as Ai approaches I, managerial effort gets closer to the first best, hence the role of additional 
internal funds in spurring incentives becomes less important. Formally, on Ai E [Ai, I] the value 
function is concave: 
2Vi a2e* (ae* 2 
gi2=^ [7r - le*]- l 1 <0, aA 2 aA2 aA i 
as implied by 
e* C [Tri/2,l, 7ri/,], ae /aAi = 1/(2e* - 7ri) > 0, 
and 
a2e /aA2 = [-2,8/(2Pe - rri)2](ae /Ai) < 0. 
The following lemma establishes whether additional internal assets are more valuable to 
more- or less-productive business units.15 
Lemma 2. Suppose two productive units have different returns if successful: 7rl < 72. Then 
(i) unit 1 is more likely to be shut down: A1 > A2, 
(ii) unit l's value function is shifted downward: V1 < V2, and 
(iii) aVl/aA1 > aV2/aA2 for Ai > Al, i = 1, 2, with aV1,/aA = aV2/aA2 in Ai = I. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The third result in Lemma 2 is central to our article, implying that additional internal funds 
may well be more valuable to less-productive business units. This is because the less productive 
unit, having (ceteris paribus) lower returns to pledge in case of success, is obliged to relinquish a 
14 Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) have already shown this result in a model with a binary effort decision. 
15 In this very simple model where project payoffs have a binary distribution, the subsidiary with higher returns in 
case of success is ceteris paribus more profitable. Although we sometimes refer to the subsidiary with a higher (lower) 
effortproductivity as the more (less) profitable one, there is an obvious distinction between effort productivity nri (which of 
course affects profitability but is exogenous to the model) andfirm profitability, which endogenously depends on internal 
liquidity and thus on resource reallocation within the group. 
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FIGURE 2 
VALUE FUNCTIONS OF SUBSIDIARIES 1 AND 2 
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* Ai 
A2 A1 I 
larger share ai to outside investors. This in turn exacerbates its incentive problem with respect to 
the more productive unit. Additional internal funds allowing a reduction in the share ai are then 
more valuable to this unit. The result suggests that a headquarters trying to maximize a group's 
value need not necessarily concentrate resources on the most productive unit. 
a Efficient resource allocation. Consider productive units 1 and 2 affiliated with a group, 
with lT < 7r2. We assume from now on that 7r2 > fB1(2 + /2) (see footnote 17 on this). At date 
0, the headquarters chooses A1 and A2 so as to solve the problem 
max V(A1, 7rl) + V(A2, r2) 
Ai,A2 
subject to 
Al + A2 = A. 
The following proposition characterizes the optimal resource allocation. 
Proposition 1. For any lr < 7r2, there exists a threshold A(7rl) such that if A > A(w1), it is 
optimal to let both subsidiaries operate and assign relatively more resources to the weaker one. 
Hence, A* > A1 and A2 > A2, with A* > A2. If instead A < A(7rT), all resources are diverted 
to the more productive subsidiary while unit 1 is shut down. The threshold A(rz) is strictly 
decreasing in T1. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
When internal resources are scarce or group subsidiaries have very different productivity 
levels, winner picking maximizes the group value, namely, all resources are channelled to the 
more productive unit. Otherwise, cross-subsidization takes place from the more- to the less- 
productive unit. This result becomes intuitive once resource allocation is regarded as a two-stage 
decision process. We first ask whether it is optimal to keep both subsidiaries open (in which case 
each must receive at least Ai), rather than shut unit 1 down and divert all resources to 2. Before 
opting for the winner-picking solution, the increase in V2 due to stronger incentives in unit 2 must 
be traded off with the discrete benefit of providing unit 1 with enough funds (Al > A1) to let it 
start a profitable project. Diverting all resources to unit 2 cannot be efficient when A is very large, 
to the extent that internal funds have a decreasing marginal value for a unit. Hence, for high levels 
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of A, it is optimal to operate both subsidiaries.16 It is also fairly intuitive that winner picking 
becomes less likely as the two units' productivities get closer (i.e., when rl is increased).17 
Secondly, provided both units are allowed to operate, A must be optimally shared between 
the two. As agency problems are exacerbated for the less productive unit, additional internal 
resources are more valuable to it; hence, a cross-subsidization strategy is optimal in this case. 
o Discussion and related literature. We compare here the result in Proposition 1 to related 
work on internal capital markets. For this purpose, it is useful to think of the business group as 
the outcome of a "merger" between two stand-alone firms, each endowed with A/2, and with 
productivity levels nr and rT2. Clearly, the ability to shift internal resources within the group 
creates value: 
max VI(A1) + V2(A - A) > V1 + V2 ( 
Before us, other articles have pointed at this "financial synergy" as a main motive for 
conglomeration (e.g., Stein, 1997; Fluck and Lynch, 1999; Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002). The 
novel feature of our model is that the financial synergy takes very different forms, depending 
on the total amount of internal resources and the productivity differential between stronger and 
weaker units. In particular, three interesting cases may arise. 
If A/2 C (A2, A1) but A > A(lri), the internal capital market allows unit 1 to start a profitable 
project that would not be able to get funding as a stand-alone. Fluck and Lynch (1999) also propose 
a theory of conglomerate mergers allowing the financing of projects that would be denied funds 
as stand-alones. While this is the only financial advantage of conglomeration in their article, the 
next two cases show that resource flexibility brings other benefits in our model. 
A second case arises when A/2 > A1 and A > A(r,). Upon affiliation to a monopolistic 
firm, a relatively less-productive firm receives a cash injection that alleviates its agency problems 
vis-a-vis outside investors. In other words, access to an internal capital market allows a project 
that can already be funded as a stand-alone to write a "better" contract with outside financiers. In a 
sense, this generalizes to a continuous framework Fluck and Lynch's intuition that mergers serve 
to channel funds to marginally profitable units.18 This cross-subsidization result is in line with 
empirical articles documenting that both multidivisional firms and business groups redistribute 
resources away from more-profitable units to units with worse investment opportunities.19 Various 
articles (e.g., Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts, 1992; Scharfstein and Stein, 1998) argue that cross- 
subsidization represents the dark side of internal capital markets, and attribute the phenomenon to 
exacerbated agency problems and power struggles within conglomerates and groups. We showed 
here that cross-subsidization within cash-rich groups may be as well an efficient allocation 
16 One may wonder whether the opportunity cost of shifting resources from the more- to the less-productive 
subsidiary is not underestimated in our fixed investment model. We believe our qualitative results would still hold in 
a model where each unit has a continuum of projects of decreasing value to invest in (or a variable scale project with 
decreasing returns). In such a model, information problems would imply that larger internal resources allow a subsidiary to 
raise more funds and thus to run more projects (see, e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). The basic intuition of Proposition 
1 would still be there: injecting additional liquidity in a high-productivity unit has a decreasing value, to the extent that 
(a) this unit has less trouble in raising external funds to finance further projects with respect to the weak unit or (b) further 
projects have a decreasing value. 
17 As shown in the Appendix, the assumption r2 > f31(2 + v/2) ensures that for trl = Tr2, winner picking never 
takes place (even for low levels of A). We are thus ruling out the less interesting case where (for a cash-poor group) it is 
optimal to shut down unit 1 for nr = 7r2 and, thus, for any 7rl < nT2. 
18 In Fluck and Lynch (1999) the nature of the agency problem is different from here: returns are not verifiable, 
hence a firm is funded provided the financial contract can induce managers to pay investors back in any period. The binary 
nature of the manager's decision in their model (pay back or not) implies that as long as the incentive constraint holds and 
the firm manages to get financed, the firm value is not affected by the amount of outside versus inside equity. Conversely, 
in our model managerial effort and firm value continuously increase with the amount of inside equity. 
19 See, for instance, Ferris, Kim, and Kitsabunnarat (2003) on Korean chaebols and Perotti and Gelfer (2001) on 
Russian business groups. For evidence on multidivisional firms, see Shin and Stultz (1998), Scharfstein (1998), and Rajan, 
Servaes, and Zingales (2000). However, see Chevalier (2004) for an argument that cross-subsidization results in the latter 
articles can be attributed to measurement errors and selection bias. 
? RAND 2005. 
202 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
decision, to the extent that it creates value by smoothing incentive problems across productive 
units. 
Notice finally that for sufficiently low levels of irn it may be the case that A/2 > A1 and 
yet A < A(r1 ).20 Although a stand-alone firm, being committed to its home market, would start 
project 1, an efficient business group shuts unit 1 down and diverts all resources to the relatively 
more productive unit. Hence, the advantage of resource flexibility also rests on the group's ability 
to engage in winner picking when this is called for (i.e., when weak units have very low productivity 
levels). In a model of multidivisional firms where individual divisions do not raise external funds, 
Stein (1997) also finds that headquarters may give weaker projects less financing than they could 
obtain as stand-alones. However, in contrast to our article, winner picking always takes place in 
his model. 
To conclude this discussion, it is worth noting that our basic model of internal capital markets 
focuses on the benefits of resource flexibility while neglecting its costs. First, in maximizing the 
group's value, the internal resource allocation may well hurt the interests of individual subsidiaries' 
shareholders. However, by taking as exogenous the group's initial financial structure, we are 
ruling out any agency cost that may derive from minority shareholder expropriation.21 Most 
articles on pyramids so far have done the reverse: Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000), for 
instance, stress the agency costs arising in pyramidal groups while neglecting any benefits that 
may rationalize their existence. Secondly, we are assuming that the group is free to redistribute 
assets at t = 0, but not date-2 profits. This rules out the possibility that the headquarters' authority 
to engage in resource reallocation blunts managerial incentives in individual subsidiaries. We 
share this assumption with other models of internal capital markets (e.g., Matsusaka and Nanda, 
2002; Stein, 1997), with the positive exception of Brusco and Panunzi (2005), where diminished 
managerial incentives represent the cost of an expost efficient resource allocation. In what follows, 
we show that resource allocation within a business group also responds to the competitive 
environments where subsidiaries operate. Hence, establishing an internal capital market may 
engender substantial strategic advantages or disadvantages. This is a further channel through 
which resource flexibility may affect a group's value. 
3. Resource allocation with product market competition 
* In this section we study how internal resource allocation is affected by competitive conditions 
in markets where a group operates. The assumptions are the same as in the basic model presented 
in Section 2, except that now business units face imperfect competition in their respective markets. 
Subsidiary 1 and subsidiary 2 operate in separate product markets. Thus, they differ in that they 
may be faced with more- or less-aggressive competitors. To simplify the analysis, we assume that 
subsidiary 1 competes in a duopoly market (market 1) while subsidiary 2 is a monopolist in its 
own market. We denote by R subsidiary l's rival. 
The timing is as follows: At t = 0, the headquarters allocates A1 and A2 to subsidiaries 1 and 
2. At t = 1, each manager writes a contract {cai } with outside investors to raise I - Ai if needed. 
At t = 2, managers of all productive units simultaneously choose their levels of unverifiable effort 
ei (i = 1, 2, R). At t = 3, returns are realized. Competition in market 1 is modelled as follows. 
A productive unit receives a return rn only if its project succeeds and the rival's project does 
not, otherwise it earns zero.22 Under this assumption, unit i's project (with i = 1, R) generates a 
return 7r with probability ei(1 - ej), where i : j and ei is firm i's R&D effort. R&D effort thus 
20 In the Appendix (Lemma Al) we characterize the threshold level of rt1 below which this case arises. 
21 Of course one may wonder why, in the first place, minority shareholders are present in the group's financial 
structure at date 0. This question would be easily addressed in a model with ex ante uncertainty on the subsidiaries' 
productivity levels. In such a model, internal resource reallocation acts as an insurance mechanism against negative shocks 
that can hit individual subsidiaries. Delegating control to the group's headquarters would thus be a credible commitment 
to a resource allocation that is ex ante optimal for all subsidiaries but that individual subsidiaries' shareholders may dislike 
ex post. 
22 This is the case, for instance, when R&D for a new product is being carried out, and Bertrand competition takes 
place between two successful innovators. 
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represents the strategic variable in market 1. All exogenous parameters (A, Ii, 7r, f), as well as 
competitive conditions in both markets, are common knowledge among competitors. 
Finally, we make the following assumptions. First, financial contracts are not observed 
by product market rivals when R&D efforts are chosen. This rules out any commitment effect 
associated with the choice of contracts. Second, while investors obviously observe I - Ai and 
thus Ai, product market rivals do not (or, equivalently, headquarters cannot credibly commit to 
a given allocation). This assumption rules out the possibility of a strategic allocation of internal 
funds within the group. In spite of this, we will show that the allocation of internal resources 
within a corporate group does respond to product market factors.23 
We now characterize unit 1's best response (i.e., its entry decision and postentry effort) to its 
rival's contract, taking the rival's contract, and thus its level of effort, as given. This best response 
is a function of internal assets A . Then we find the optimal resource allocation, which maximizes 
the group's value taking the rival's effort as given. 
o Outside finance, internal resources, and competition. The financial contracting problem 
of unit 2 can be solved along the lines of Lemma 1, with nr replacing 7r2. The financing problem 
of a productive unit operating in market 1 is also analogous to the one analyzed in Section 2, 
except that now the unit's expected payoff is el (1 - eR)7r.24 Hence (1 - eR)n must substitute 7rl 
throughout the model, so that increasing eR is equivalent to reducing rr in the model of Section 
2. Following directly from Lemma 1, Corollary 1 characterizes the financial contract and the 
equilibrium effort el for any given pair (eR, A1). 
Corollary 1. For any level of the rival's effort eR E [0, 1 - (v/2I//r)] there exists a threshold 
level of assets Al(eR) E [I - 2(1 - eR)2/4 ], I] such that 
(i) if A1 > Al(eR), the unit can obtain outside funds and compete in market 1; at is 
decreasing in A1; and e\(AI, eR) is increasing in A1 and decreasing in eR; and 
(ii) if A1 < Al(eR), the unit is either unprofitable or cannot obtain outside funds, hence it 
is shut down. 
Being confronted with a tougher competitor makes it more difficult for a firm to obtain 
outside funds, to the extent that an increase in eR reduces the firm's profitability and thus the 
income pledgeable to investors. Having a tougher competitor also weakens managerial incentives, 
thus reducing effort el; hence, competition in market 1 is in strategic substitutes. From Lemma 
2, it is also immediate that an increase in eR reduces a business unit's value Vi(Al, eR), but, for 
all A1 > Al(eR), it increases its sensitivity to internal resources aV1 /Al . 
The headquarters' resource allocation problem in t = 0 is also analogous to the one solved 
in Section 2. Since the allocation of resources is not observable to product market competitors, 
the headquarters chooses AI and A2 taking the rival's effort eR as given: 
max V1 (A1, eR) + V2 (A2), 
Al ,A2 
subject to 
Al + A2 = A. 
Proceeding from Proposition 1, Corollary 2 characterizes the internal resource allocation for 
all pairs (eR, A). 
Corollary 2. For any eR E [0, 1 - (2 /7r)], there exists a threshold level of resources A(eR) 
such that, if A > A(eR), it is optimal for a business group to operate in both markets and assign 
23 Hence, our theory does not rely on the hypothesis of Brander and Lewis (1986) that financial contracts represent 
credible commitments (i.e., cannot be secretly renegotiated). To neutralize commitment effects, the nonobservability of 
financial contracts by third parties has been assumed in the most recent literature on corporate finance and product markets 
(see Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey, 1998). For many forms of finance (such as private equity or bank loans), this is a very 
reasonable assumption. 
24 Thus, rr2/4P < I and eR < 1 - (V I/nr) replace Assumption 1. 
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relatively more resources to the subsidiary facing more-intense competition. Hence, A (eR) > A, 
with AT(eR) increasing in eR. If instead A < A(eR), all resources are diverted to the subsidiary 
operating in the monopolistic market. The threshold A(eR) is strictly increasing in eR. 
Conventional wisdom holds that in business groups, cash flows generated by monopolistic 
units are used to subsidize those units facing intense competition. Our result departs from this 
claim in two ways. First, resource flexibility may well encourage a group to swiftly exit a market 
where competition is toughening: a very high effort expected from competitors may increase the 
threshold A(eR) well above the group's resources A, which in turn makes it optimal to exit market 
1. Hence, very intense competition makes winner picking rather than cross-subsidization more 
likely. It is true, however, that if either competition is not too strong or the group's assets are large 
enough, A is larger than the threshold A(eR) and subsidization of the unit facing competition 
becomes optimal. Yet, in contrast to standard deep-pocket arguments, our cross-subsidization 
result does not rely on strategic motivations:25 as the allocation of resources is not observable, 
unit 1 is not subsidized to affect its competitor's behavior, but simply because it faces a more 
problematic access to outside finance and thus more serious incentive problems. 
o Financially constrained entry of business subsidiaries versus stand-alone firms. We are 
interested in studying how affiliation with a business group affects a firm's behavior in the product 
market. To this aim, we take as a benchmark a stand-alone firm endowed with assets A/2 < I and 
compare its entry (or symmetrically its exit) decision in market 1 with the behavior of a business 
group endowed with resources A < 21.26 From Corollary 1 we know that the stand-alone firm 
operates in market 1 provided A/2 > Al(eR), or A > 2Al(eR). Corollary 2 instead states that 
the group enters (or stays) in market 1 if and only if A > A(eR). Both 2Al(eR) and A(eR) are 
strictly increasing in eR, i.e., increased competition makes entry less likely. However, the cutoff 
level of assets below which entry is prevented (exit is triggered) displays a different sensitivity to 
the market's competitive conditions for a business group with respect to a stand-alone firm. The 
implications of this are formally stated in the next lemma and illustrated in Figure 3. 
Lemma 3. There exists a level of the rival's effort 
eR 
3E- 2r 
such that A(eR) > 2Al(eR) if and only if eR > eR. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Resource flexibility within the group is the key to this result. A stand-alone firm exits a market 
when increased competition either makes it unable to raise funds or drives its net present value to 
zero. When competition is not intense, cross-subsidization occurs within the group, slackening 
the unit's financial constraint and hence making the entry decision less sensitive to competitive 
conditions. Thus, A(eR) < 2Al(eR). However, although a stand-alone firm is committed to its 
home market, a group's assets are not, as they can easily be shifted to more-profitable affiliates. 
When very intense competition makes unit 1 much less profitable than its monopolistic partner, 
this winner-picking effect dominates, accounting for an increased sensitivity of the cutoff A(eR) 
to competitive conditions. Thus, for high levels of eR, A(eR) > 2A (eR). 
To summarize, resource flexibility need not make the group less prone to stay in market 
1 with respect to a stand-alone firm. For all eR < eR, group membership, providing access 
to deeper pockets, makes entry more likely, while for eR > eR, resource flexibility translates 
into winner picking, making entry into a highly competitive market less likely. In other words, 
25 See Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) for a model where internal resources and financial contracts, being observable, 
affect the firm's ability to prey on rivals and to deter predation. 
26 We thus assess the impact for a stand-alone unit of affiliation to a firm with equal endowment A/2 but facing a 
less competitive environment. 
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FIGURE 3 
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resource flexibility makes a business group more prone to either swiftly exit a market in response 
to increased competition or "stay and fight," in line with recent empirical findings by Khanna and 
Tice (2001).27 
4. The strategic effects of business group affiliation 
i Conventional wisdom suggests that affiliation with a business group, providing access to 
the group's deep pockets, makes a financially constrained firm less vulnerable to entry deterrence 
and predatory practices of rival firms. According to this view, the resource flexibility ensured in 
an internal capital market would represent an important strategic advantage of group affiliation. 
However, things are not so straightforward, as our formal analysis shows. 
o Does group affiliation facilitate entry? Assume that firm R is the incumbent in market 1 
and can commit to a higher R&D effort. For instance, firm R has deep pockets (AR > I) and at 
t = 0 can make a costly verifiable investment in expertise to reduce its marginal cost of R&D effort 
and thus shift its reaction function upward until entry is deterred. Of course, the more difficult 
deterring entry is, the less likely firm R is to adopt a costly commitment to a tough R&D strategy. 
Following the analysis of Section 3, we define here the cutoff levels of the rival's effort that deter 
entry in market 1. For a stand-alone firm endowed with assets A/2, entry is deterred when the 
rival's effort is expected to lie above eR -= A1(A/2). For a business group with resources A and 
enjoying a monopoly in a second market, entry is deterred if the rival's effort is expected to lie 
above eR - A (A). Lemma 3 immediately implies the following result. 
Corollary 3. There exists a level of assets A E (0, 21) such that eR(A) > eR(A/2) if and only if 
A <A. 
This result implies that group affiliation may both discourage and invite entry deterrence 
by incumbent firms. A stand-alone firm with poor resources (A/2 < A/2) is vulnerable to 
entry deterrence, making its financial constraints bind. Affiliation with a business group enjoying 
monopoly power in another market guarantees access to deep pockets and thus reduces the 
sensitivity of the firm's financing constraints to the rivals' actions. In this case, the internal capital 
market acts as a credit line contract aimed at discouraging predation by competing firms. Hence, 
27 Khanna and Tice study how multidivisional firms and stand-alone units in the discount department store business 
reacted to Wal-Mart's entry into their markets between 1975 and 1996. They find that multidivisional firms differ in their 
response to new entry: compared to stand-alone firms, they "appear to be quicker in making the decision to either exit the 
discount business or stay and fight" (p. 1491) and, conditional on staying, invest more in the discount business than do 
their focused counterparts. 
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resource flexibility alleviates the difficulty of financially constrained entry for profitable but cash- 
poor stand-alones. 
However, a cash-rich stand-alone firm does not benefit from affiliation with a group enjoying 
monopoly elsewhere. In fact, in this case winner-picking considerations may well induce the 
headquarters to channel the firm's resources to its more profitable monopolistic affiliate and exit 
market 1 if competition is toughening there. Hence, resource flexibility encourages the rival's 
entry deterrence behavior, whereas instead the stand-alone's commitment of resources to its 
home market would discourage predatory practices. This result is closely related to Matsusaka 
and Nanda (2002), in which the flexibility ensured by internal capital markets always entails a 
commitment cost for conglomerate divisions.28 
o Group affiliation and R&D strategy. To analyze the strategic effects of group affiliation, 
we now consider the case where entry has occurred and characterize a subsidiary's R&D strategy as 
opposed to that of a stand-alone firm endowed with A/2. In fact, to the extent that internal resources 
determine managerial incentives, the R&D strategy of the stand-alone firm may significantly 
change upon affiliation with a business group. 
We know from Corollary 2 that-conditional upon entering market 1-the business group 
always subsidizes unit 1, hence 
A 
AT(eR) > - for all eR C (0, eR(A)]. 
This internal cash infusion in turn reduces firm 1's need for outside finance and thus improves its 
effort incentives: 
el(A(eR)) > el (2 
Therefore, affiliation with the group, provided entry occurs, shifts the firm's reaction function 
upward and is thus a credible commitment to adopt a tougher R&D strategy. This is in line 
with existing empirical evidence: Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) find that although 
conglomerates represent only 40% of new entrants, they account for 50% of the entrants' output 
in all the industries analyzed in their sample. 
Indeed, group affiliation also affects the slope of a firm's reaction function. By differentiating 
a stand-alone's optimal effort e\ (characterized in Corollary 1) with respect to eR, one can obtain 
the slope of the best-reply function: 
del ae < d I <0. 
deR aeR A1=A 
The subsidiary's best-reply function ee(eR) can instead be obtained by plugging AT(eR) into 
et(A1, eR). Its slope is therefore 
de\(eR) aet aet aAt(eR) I i I+ <0. 
deR aeR Al=A,(eR) aA1 aeR 
(-) (+) 
The second term in the above expression captures the reallocation effect. If the rival gets 
tougher, the headquarters ubsidizes unit 1 (BAI(eR)/aeR > 0); the additional internal resources 
alleviate the manager's incentive problem and induce a higher effort (Be (eR)/BAl > 0). Note 
28 In Matsusaka and Nanda (2002) cross-subsidization never takes place, so it is always the case that fewer resources 
are assigned to a division when new competitors enter its market. The division is thus unable to credibly commit to an 
entry-deterring overinvestment. This explains why in that article, in stark contrast with our results, access to an internal 
capital market always brings a strategic disadvantage. 
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The impact of business group affiliation on R&D strategy is summarized in the following 
proposition and illustrated in Figure 4. 
Proposition 2. Affiliation with a business group, conditional upon entry in market 1, shifts a 
firm's reaction function upward and makes it flatter. 
Both effects justify why business group affiliates are often perceived as dangerous entrants 
in the product market. 
o Accommodated entry and protection from strategic commitments. As is well known, 
in the case of accommodated entry an incumbent's strategic incentives to commit to a high or 
a low effort depend on the nature of competition, that is, on the slope of the entrant's best- 
reply function.29 If R&D efforts are strategic substitutes, as is the case here, an incumbent firm 
has an incentive to commit to a high effort in order to make the entrant softer and increase 
its own profits. This strategic commitment is more valuable for the incumbent the larger is the 
strategic effect, i.e., the reduction in the entrant's effort following the increase in its own effort. 
Having a flatter reaction function, a business group subsidiary discourages the incumbent from 
adopting such costly commitment to high R&D levels. Hence, when competition is in strategic 
substitutes, business group affiliation is a defensive response to rivals threatening to take aggressive 
precommitments. 
Strategic complementarity and business group affiliation. One may alternatively ask whether 
business group affiliation is desirable when R&D efforts are strategic complements.30 This requires 
setting up a different model where strong R&D spillovers make a firm's discovery more profitable 
29 We refer to Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) for a taxonomy of the incumbent's strategic incentives when the entrant 
firms are stand-alones. Their article shows that a commitment strategy to be tough is adopted when the entrant's reaction 
function is downward sloping. Conversely, a commitment to be soft and thus make the incumbent nonaggressive is optimal 
when the entrant's reaction function is upward sloping and entry is accommodated. 
30 In a previous version of this article (Cestone and Fumagalli, 2001), we modelled R&D efforts along the lines of 
Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1998) so that strategic substitutability and complementarity in R&D efforts endogenously 
arose within the model. 
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when its rivals invest more in R&D.31 For instance, one might assume that expected R&D profits 
are 
el r +eleR Ar, 
with Air > 0 capturing the effect of R&D spillovers, so that a firm's productivity of effort 
ir + eR Air is increasing in the rival's effort. It is easy to see that in this model cross-subsidization 
would still make a subsidiary's reaction function flatter with respect to a stand-alone's, the reason 
being now that resources are drained from a unit whose rival is exerting a larger effort. This of 
course has a different strategic implication: an incumbent accommodating entry may want to 
commit to a high R&D effort so as to spur the entrant's R&D; however, being less responsive 
to the rival's effort, a business group subsidiary discourages such procollusive strategic moves. 
This represents a strategic cost of business group affiliation when competition is in strategic 
complements. 
o Discussion and related literature. As already discussed in the Introduction and in Section 
2, our results have an obvious relation to the large body of research on internal capital markets. 
In this subsection we point out the relation to other strands of literature. 
Financially constrained entry. Our results on stand-alone entry versus business group entry draw 
on the prior intuition that when external capital markets are not perfect, deep pockets are a source 
of competitive advantage. Deep pockets allow a firm to engage in predatory practices to drive its 
rivals out of the market or, alternatively, to withstand predation (Telser, 1966), whereas financial 
constraints undermine a firm's ability to endure a price war (Benoit, 1984).32 Hence, a cash-poor 
firm may want to sign a credit line contract with a bank to limit the scope for predation (Bolton 
and Scharfstein, 1990). Our article builds a bridge between these works and the literature on 
internal capital markets, and it questions the informal claim that access to an internal capital 
market always makes a firm less vulnerable to entry deterrence and predatory practices. The 
model proposed predicts that while in general, business groups tend to subsidize units faced with 
more-intense competition, they are more prone than cash-rich stand-alones to exit a market where 
tough predatory practices are put in place. Hence, while affiliation with a group shields cash-poor 
firms from entry deterrence, it can only harm those firms with enough liquidity to withstand 
predatory practices as stand-alones. 
One might expect that external finance is more difficult to obtain in sectors characterized by 
intangible-asset investments and severe asymmetric information; an empirical implication of our 
model is thus that business group affiliation is particularly effective in favoring entry in R&D- 
intensive industries. This is in line with the stylized fact that multinational enterprises are often 
present in high-tech industries (see, e.g., Caves, 1982) and is also consistent with Brock's (1986) 
finding that the only method of entry into the computer industry in the 1970s was by subsidization 
of the computer effort from other units of the corporation, as was the case for General Electric 
and RCA. 
Conglomerate power. Our article also provides a formal framework to address concerns that 
conglomeration (here in the form of group affiliation) may be a source of market power. The 
competitive behavior of multimarket corporations has been the object of a literature dating back 
31 In a model where firms compete in the product market and R&D spillovers exist, D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) find in fact that R&D investments may be either strategic substitutes or complements, depending on how large R&D spillovers are. 
32 These early articles have spurred a considerable amount of research on the interaction between financial structure 
and product market behavior. Poitevin (1989) has argued that entrants are more leveraged than incumbents, and thus more 
vulnerable to predation, because they bear more-severe asymmetric information vis-h-vis investors. In Maksimovic (1988) 
and Spagnolo (2000), corporate financial policy can hamper or favor tacit collusion among competing firms. Cestone and White (2003) show instead that the financial contracts signed by incumbents can deter entry by affecting the credit market 
behavior of investors toward entrant firms. 
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to at least Edwards (1955).33 Our results are obviously related to the idea that the anti-competitive 
potential of conglomeration relies on cross-subsidization, whereby a firm uses its profits from one 
market to support predatory practices in another market. Similar concerns have been expressed 
with respect to multinational enterprises and, more recently, to privatized European utilities, 
which have been accused of financing aggressive pricing abroad using profits from protected 
home markets. 
Probably the main lesson from our formal analysis is that one should be cautious about 
associating anticompetitive effects with business groups' presence in a market. For instance, 
Corollary 3 gives conditions under which group affiliation allows a firm to overcome entry 
deterrence strategies of deep-pocketed incumbents and thus helps reduce industry concentration. 
Group membership can also represent the only means of entry in markets that are already 
dominated by business groups.34 Furthermore, entrant business groups may well promote 
competition by adopting more-aggressive strategies than would stand-alone firms (see Proposition 
2). Of course, once business groups have entered a market and enjoy monopoly rents elsewhere, 
they also bear an anticompetitive potential, to the extent that access to deep pockets and 
commitment to tough strategies may soon turn them into dangerous predators driving rivals 
out of the market. It is thus less obvious whether the procompetitive effect of group entry lasts for 
long. Which effect is the most relevant in practice is largely an empirical question, on which the 
available evidence is not conclusive. Lawrence (1991) shows that imports and entry tend to be 
low in Japanese markets where keiretsu-affiliated firms have large market shares. Weinstein and 
Yafeh (1995) explain this evidence with their finding that keiretsu-affiliated firms compete more 
aggressively. However, legal scholars have argued that the pro-competitive effect of groups often 
prevails and is indeed the reason why incumbents react to group entry by bringing complaints to 
competition authorities.35 
Multimarket spillovers. A main implication of our model is that internal resource flexibility 
within business groups generates multimarket spillovers, so that factors affecting competition in 
one market also affect the business group's (and its rivals') strategies in a second market. In fact, our 
article is closely related to Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer's (1985) seminal formalization 
of multimarket spillovers. In their model, a firm is a monopolist in one market (say, market 2) 
and competes in strategic substitutes (or complements) in another, oligopoly market (market 1). 
As production costs are interdependent, a change of conditions in the monopoly market leads the 
firm to reoptimize its overall product market strategies and thus also affects the equilibrium in the 
oligopoly market. For instance, if there are joint economies of scope across markets, a positive 
demand shock in market 2 leads the firm to adopt a more aggressive strategy in market 1 as well, 
which may possibly drive its rivals out. 
In our model, the sign of multimarket spillovers depends on the expected financial reaction 
of the business group to industry shocks. Following a shock in market 2, the group's headquarters 
reoptimizes the internal resource allocation, which affects subsidiary 2's and subsidiary 1's 
external financing problem and, thus, their respective product market strategies. Knowing how 
resources are reallocated in response to changes in different markets is thus crucial to assess how 
multimarket effects work under the influence of internal capital market phenomena.36 This is 
where our article makes a novel contribution to the understanding of multimarket competition. 
33 See also Caves (1982), Teece (1982), and van Witteloostuijn and van Wegberg (1984) for a broad survey of the 
topic. 
34 We thank an anonymous referee for spurring these considerations. 
35 For instance, in 1981 the U.S. firm Zenith accused Matsushita and other Japanese firms of subsidizing predatory 
prices in the U.S. television set market with profits from domestic sales, but eventually the Supreme Court ruled out a 
case for predation. Recent studies have confirmed ex post that this decision was well taken: Japanese firms never gained 
dominance of the U.S. market, and the price of TV sets continued to decline in the postentry period (see Elzinga, 1999). 
36 Consider for instance the claim that an incumbent group can extend its monopoly power across industries. 
Indeed, the potential for anticompetitive spillovers greatly depends on the group's expected financial reaction to entry: a 
rival will be discouraged from (encouraged to) entering if he expects cross-subsidization of (resource drainage from) the 
subsidiary facing his entry. Thus, an empirical prediction of our model is that business groups are better at deterring entry 
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5. Conclusion 
* Competition authorities have often pointed at financial factors and internal capital market 
phenomena as the source of the anticompetitive impact of business groups.37 Yet, antitrust 
decisions so far could not rely on a formal assessment of financially driven multimarket effects. Our 
article makes a first attempt at filling this gap. To this purpose, we have analyzed the functioning 
of internal capital markets in business groups, showing that both winner picking and cross- 
subsidization may occur in value-maximizing groups. Second, we have studied the strategic 
effects of group membership, arguing that resource flexibility brings both strategic benefits and 
costs. 
There are some issues that our article does not deal with. Our model does not aim at explaining 
why a pyramidal structure is put in place. Taking the group's structure as exogenous, we study its 
internal resource allocation process, and the implications of this for the member firms' competitive 
behavior. In fact, to focus on the strategic impact of resource flexibility, we have abstracted from 
the agency costs of finance that business groups may face.38 To this aim, we have assumed 
a pyramidal structure where existing minority shareholders are silent in the face of potential 
expropriation of internal assets at date 0, and new financiers have no reason to fear the tunnelling 
of funds lent at date 1 (see footnote 13). As a consequence, in the nonstrategic setting of Section 
2, internal capital markets bring only benefits, whereas the only costs of resource flexibility arise 
in the strategic environment of Sections 3 and 4. 
To make predictions on when business groups arise as an optimal organization structure, 
one should consider the strategic impact of resource flexibility but also take into account the 
potentially larger costs of finance that group subsidiaries may face. Our model could be extended 
in this direction by assuming that subsidiaries run projects of variable, rather than fixed, size. 
In this context, having a subsidiary raise external funds does not ensure that they are used to 
running a larger project in that subsidiary rather than being tunnelled to a less productive unit. 
Outside investors thus fear expropriation, as the value of their claim in a subsidiary depends on 
the latter's size. As a result, in such a model date- tunnelling would be an issue, making external 
finance potentially more costly for group subsidiaries than for stand-alone firms. We leave this 
topic for future research (but see Brusco and Panunzi (2005) for an analysis of the costs and 
benefits of centralized control on resources that abstracts from strategic effects). Our model is 
not one of diversification; hence, we cannot make predictions on the impact of diversification on 
groups' internal capital markets and member firms' product market behavior. Finally, we do not 
ask which factors lead entrepreneurs to put in place business groups rather than multidivisional 
firms; Wolfenzon (1999) and Nicodano (2003) are the first attempts at comparing these two 
organizational forms. 
Appendix 
* Proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3 and Proposition 1 follow. 
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) From Lemma 1 we know that Ai can take two values. In case 1, Ai - I (rti2/4/B), hence 
aAi/ai7r < 0. In case 2, Ai = Af, where Ai =_ (r2? - I - JrTi ri - 2I/)//8 solves ui(Ai) = 0. Trivial algebra 
shows that aAfP/ari < 0. 
of small firms, as this is expected to spur a cross-subsidization response, but invite large-scale entry, which rather leads 
the group to scale down its presence in a market. 
37 For instance, the European Commission recently maintained that following a merger with General Electric, 
Honeywell would have been able to adopt predatory practices relying on GE's financial strength. Similar concerns have 
been expressed by the Italian competition authority with respect to Italy's Enel using its monopoly electricity profits to 
buy its way into the telecom sector (see The Economist, "Special Report on Privatization in Europe," June 29, 2002, pp. 
71-73). 
38 Other articles (e.g., Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis, 2000) have instead focused on minority shareholders' 
expropriation in pyramidal groups and stressed the implied agency costs, thus raising the puzzle of why pyramids exist 
in the first place. 
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(ii) We then prove that the value function is shifted upward as 7ri increases. In region Ai > Ai, 
dVi aVi, e* [ Vi 1 ae* : ~ + =e : *+ [7ri - fe*] > O. I - 7+-[ii-.& ]>O dyi ari rci L aei  e ai 
This is always true, as ei E (7ri/2p, 7ri/P] implies [rri - fie] > 0 and ae*/7nri = e*/(2pe* - ri) > 0. In region 
Ai < Ai, it can easily be checked that V(7rl) < V(72) V 7rl < 7r2. 
(iii) Last, we compare the slopes of V1 and V2 (with nz < 7r2) when both units receive the same amount of 
internal resources: A1 = A2 = A? > A1. Remember that if A? E (A1, I], both value functions take the form 
Vi = e:ri - (P/2)(ei)2 - I. One can then show 
a2V/ 
_ 
2e aeF ae 1 i [Z .-h e*I+ aIe [  ae Ai azri aA ' AAi a ri 
2e* r[ aVi] ae* r aZ2v 
aAiazri aei J aA aei a7ri 
with a2Vi/lAiA7Ti = 0 only if Ai = I. The last inequality always holds, as e* E (7ri/2P, B i/f] implies that 
a2e*/aAianTi = 
-ri/(2pe! - 7ri)3 < 0 and 
-, 
_e 
- 
il= B i < 0. 
[ ari 2Be2 - ri- 
Note that a decrease in productivity has two effects on the slope of the value function. The first term represents the 
incentive effect: a smaller Tri implies a more serious incentive problem, thus a higher (positive) impact of additional 
resources on effort (a2e*/aAiazri < 0) and hence on the unit's value. The second term represents the convexity effect: 
the increase in effort due to additional resources (ae/aAAi) has a stronger impact on the unit's value when iri is smaller, 
as a2 Vl/aei ai < 0. 
Finally, in A? = Al aV2/aA2 exists but aV1/aAl does not. However, there exist V1- = 0 and V' > 
(aV2/1A2)IA2=Ao > 0. 
All this implies 
aV AV2 1 aoVI >_av  VIrI < 7r2. 
A1I A=A0 OaA2 A2=AO 
QED. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us assume first that A > A2. If not, total resources would not even allow the most productive 
unit to raise funds. Second, if A < A1 + A2, only one unit can be financed. Obviously, it is never optimal to shut the 
most productive unit, hence the solution is trivial: A1 = 0 and A2 = A. The rest of the proof thus focuses on the case 
A > A1 + A2. The proof proceeds in three steps. 
Step 1. The headquarters must first decide whether both subsidiaries should operate, which requires setting A > Ai and 
A2 > A2, or whether the less productive subsidiary should be shut, in which case A1 = 0 and A2 = A. 
Step 2. Suppose the headquarters decides to operate both subsidiaries. Conditional on this, the optimal allocation A* 
(A* = A - Al) solves 
max Vi(Ai) + V2(A- A1) 
Al 
subject to 
A1 > Ai, A- A1 > A2. 
Unless the second constraint binds, in which case it is obviously At > Ai > A2 = A AT = A2, the solution to 
this problem satisfies the condition 
avI av2 
aAl aA2 
- 
Using Lemma 2 (iii) and the concavity of Vi(.), this condition implies At > A2. If both subsidiaries are worth operating, 
then cross-subsidization takes place. 
Step 3. We now investigate when it is indeed optimal to operate both subsidiaries (and have cross-subsidization) rather 
than shut down the less productive one (i.e., winner picking). We define 
WP(A) = V2(A)- [Vi(A) + V2(A - A)]. 
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Operating both subsidiaries is optimal provided WP(A) < 0. From the envelope theorem and the strict concavity 
of V2(-) over [A2, I], it follows that WP(A) is strictly decreasing in A. In particular, for A = 21 it is always optimal to 
start both units, hence WP(2I) < O. Assume now that WP(A1 + A2) > 0. By continuity, there exists a threshold level 
of resources A E (A1 + A2, 21] such that both subsidiaries are kept open if and only if A > A, while subsidiary 1 is shut 
for A < A. From the strict concavity of V2(.) over [A2, I] and (aV1/a7rI)[A1=A > 0, it follows that AA/lari < 0. 
Consider now the case where WP(A1 + A2) < 0. It is straightforward that in this case A = Al + A2, i.e., for all 
A > Al + A2 it is never optimal to shut down subsidiary 1. It can be checked that aA/a7rl < O. Q.E.D. 
We now prove a technical result that will be used in the proof of Lemma 3. 
Lemma Al. There exists a threshold level of 7rl, l E (V/(8fi/3), 7r2), such that WP(A1 + A2) > 0, and hence 
A(nr) > AI + A2, if and only if 7ri < i1l. In other words, for low levels of rl , winner picking occurs even if the group's 
resources are sufficient to keep both units open. 
Proof. By the assumption 7r2 > /1(2+ /2), when 7l = rr2 it is WP(A2 +A2) < . Second,recall that if nr = /(8I//3), 
Vl(Al) = 0. Hence, WP(A1 + A2) = V2(A1 + A2) - V2(A2) > 0. As WP(A1 + A2) is continuous and strictly decreasing 
in rl over the interval [x/(8Bfi/3), 7r2], the result follows. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 3. We show first that the thresholds A(eR) and 2Al(eR) coincide at the extremes of the interval 
[0, 1 - (/l /nr)] over which eR varies. At eR = 0, units 1 and 2 are identical, hence Ai(0) = A2 I - . The 
assumption r2 > /BI (2 + /2) ensures that the group operates in both (monopoly) markets provided internal resources 
are enough to allow both units to raise external funds, hence A(O) = 2A1(0) = 2[1 - (r2/4p)]. At eR = 1 - (//7r), 
competition is so intense that the value of a duopoly unit is zero at the first best: V1 (I) = 0. Thus, the headquarters is 
indifferent between operating both units and diverting all resources to unit 2 provided A > 21; a stand-alone firm is 
indifferent between starting the project and shutting it down provided A/2 > I. Thus, 
A (- = 2A (1- t = 21. A n 217- 7r 7r 
We now compare A(eR) and 2Ai(eR) for all eR E (0, 1 - (2/IJ/7r)). Lemma Al implies that if eR < 1 - ( 1/7r), 
then it must be that A(eR) = Al (eR) + A2. In this case it is straightforward that A(eR) < 2A (eR), with A(eR) flatter than 
2Al(eR). 
If instead eR > 1 - (il/7r), it is A(eR) > A(eR) + A2. To investigate whether it is A(eR) < 2Ai(eR) or 
A(eR) > 2Ai(eR), we study the sign of WP(2Ai(eR)). In fact, A > 2A1 == WP(2Al(eR)) > 0, whereas 
A < 2A1 :=4 WP(2Ai(eR)) < 0. 
Three distinct cases arise. 
Case 1. If eR E (1 - (i/7r), 1 - /8I/3 r2), then Al(eR) = Af(eR) = I - [r2(1 - eR)2/4i]. Tedious calculations 
show that 
r2 
- 2/p - 7zr/(r2 + 4I - 2n2) + r2Vl -(1 - eR)4 
WP (2Ai) =- < 0, 40 
where we have defined -_ r(1 - eR). 
Case 2. Consider now higher levels of eR: eR E [1 - VJ 1 - . One can compute 
n 2 - #I + 2rlV/(n2 - 2fiI) 
Al(eR) = A1P(eR)= 
and 
I nr2 ^(f _712/3I + 8n2 - 8n (n12 - 2BI)) WP (2Ai)=- -- +4  2 4/3 4/8 
(7T2 + n2) (r2 + 9n2 - 16Pi - 8n/(n2 - 2iB)) 
48 
It can be checked that WP(2AL) < 0 in eR = 1 - /(8/fi/37r2) and WP(2A1) > 0 in eR = 1 - (3V//27r) 
(using Assumption 1, that n2 < 4/3I), with WP(2A1) strictly concave in eR. It follows that there exists a threshold 
eR E (1 - ,/(8//37r2), 1 - (3V//27r)) such that WP(2A1) > 0 if and only if eR E (eR, 1 - (3V/f/2r7)]. 
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Case 3. Finally, for eR E (1 - (3x/7/2ir), 1 - (\/2IT/r)] it is 
( r2 3n2 nr-/2 - 2 n2 + ) (2+ 9n2 - 16l - 8nV/(2- _ 21)) 
WP (2i1) = - - I ) +9 - - 2 > 0. 4/i 48 t8 48 
From Cases 1-3, it follows that A(eR) > 2Al(eR) if and only if eR E (eR, 1 - (V/JI/r)). Q.ED. 
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